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The  problem  of  gaming  in  performance  evaluation  systems  is  a 
known phenomenon (Bevan, 2006, Bevan Hood, 2006) that can take 
place  especially  when  there  are  economic  incentives  related  to 
specific targets.   
In all Tuscan Local Health Authorities (LHAs) and Teaching Hospitals 
(THs) a multidimensional performance evaluation system has been 
adopted since 2005, based on administrative and non-administrative 
data benchmarking.  
  The goal of the Tuscany performance measurement system is 
to give a general outline for the management of the LHAs and THs, 
both for evaluating performance and for enhancing and promoting the 
results of the healthcare system. The performance evaluation system 
consists  of  130  indicators  classified  in  six  dimensions:  Population 
health  assessment;  Regional  health  system;  Quality;  Patient 
satisfaction; Staff satisfaction; Efficiency and financial performance 
After three years of the performance evaluation system’s adoption, 
integrated with an incentive system, improvements were achieved in 
most of the indicators monitored. The paper reports the effects of the 
performance  evaluation  system  and  how  gaming  phenomena  were 
managed with a special focus on data manipulation. 
 
Methods 
The research team focused the analysis on the larger performance 
improvements  during  the  years  2005-2007  to  evaluate  whether 
gaming phenomena have been taking place. 
The findings of this analysis were reported and discussed with top 
managers and professionals through individual interviews and group 
meetings in order to detect the determinants of the results obtained.   4
In  2007  LHAs  and  THs  whose  indicators  clearly  show  large 
improvement  were  highlighted  during  meetings  with  the  top 




Gaming has been found in indicators concerning small and specific 
areas,  such  as  the  rate  of  hospitalization  for  heart  failure,  while 
indicators that concern larger phenomena, such as the pre-surgical 
length of stay, were less involved.  
The  request  of  evidence  to  explain  the  improvement  obtained  has 
been a deterrent to gaming behaviors. 
 
Conclusions 
The results suggest that further development is needed to analyse 
suspicious cases. The public presentation of data and the request for 
evidence to explain large improvements in peer review meetings ease 
the accountability process. In addition these can be a deterrent for 
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Introduction 
  In  2004  Tuscany  Region  has  introduced  a  multidimensional 
measurement  system  in  order  to  assess  and  monitor  its  Health 
Authorities  (HAs),  that  include  12  Local  Health  Authorities  (LHAs) 
and  4  Teaching  Hospitals  (THs).  (Nuti,2005,  Laboratorio 
Management e Sanità 2007,2008)  
After three years of performance evaluation system adoption, 
improvements were achieved in most of the indicators monitored. But 
how genuine are these improvements?  
When  the  multidimensional  performance  system  was 
developed, some assumptions described below were made. After the 
evidence of some large improvements, the research team became 
aware that a monitoring system is needed to detect whether gaming 
phenomena is taking place.  
This paper reports the path that the research team has taken in 
order to discover and manage gaming phenomena. 
The structure of the paper consists of a brief description of the 
multidimensional performance evaluation system adopted in Tuscany 
Region (Italy); the focus on distortion phenomena; how to detect and 
how to manage the suspected cases of distortion phenomena; some 
results and conclusions. 
 
 
The Tuscany multidimensional performance evaluation 
system  
The  performance  evaluation  system  was  developed  by  using 
lessons from the many performance measurement systems that have 
evolved  over  the  last  twenty  years,  in  particular  from 
multidimensional  systems  already  used  in  health  care  (Pink  et  al. 
2001)  as  well  as  the  model  of  the  Balanced  Scorecard  (BSC). 
(Kaplan,Norton 1996a,b,c) One lesson learned during this process 
was  the  importance  of  developing  the  performance  evaluation 7 
 
system  in  close  collaboration  with  health  care  professionals  and 
managers (Abernethy,Stoelwinder 1995, Jones,Dewing 1997) 
The performance evaluation system is based on 50 measures, 
consisting of more than 130 indicators, classified in six assessment 
dimensions (the letter is used to indicate each dimension): 
(A) Population health.  
(B) Regional  health  system,  to  guarantee  that 
strategic  regional  goals  are  pursued  in  the  time  and 
manner indicated. 
(C) Quality,  appropriateness,  effectiveness,  clinical 
risk management and managing supply to match demand. 
(D) Patient satisfaction, the patients’ experience and 
level of satisfaction with health services.  
(E) Staff  satisfaction,  results  of  surveys  on  the 
satisfaction level of staff with their working conditions and 
management by the LHA.  
(F) Efficiency and financial performance 
 
  In order to display each HA performance, a target chart with 
the six dimensions represented was used. The target chart is also 
divided into five bands associated with different scores and colors, 
from  dark  green,  corresponding  to  excellent  performance,  to  red, 
corresponding to poor performance. An indicator with a high score is 
displayed close to the centre (dark green), and one with a low score 
is displayed far from the centre (red). 
 
The focus: the distortion phenomena. 
When  the  research  team  developed  the  multidimensional 
performance evaluation system, as in the UK NHS, two implicit types 
of  assumptions  were  made:  the  idea  that  the  selected  indicators   8
represent the overall performance of HAs
1 and the idea that targets 
change the behaviour of individuals and organizations. (Bevan and 
Hood, 2006). Phenomena such as “hit the target but miss the point” 
or “reduce performance where targets do not apply” can take place.  
In this paper we have focused our attention on the second type 
of assumption that is linked with the possibility that HAs manipulate 
performance measurement data.  
Fisher  and  Downes  (2008)  classify  the  manipulation  of 
performance measurement data combining the degree of dishonesty 
and the four maxims of Grice (see figure 1). 
  The research team tried to detect what they call “Manipulating 
information by re-classifying data” according to their classification of 
deceit involved in data and information manipulation. In the scale of 
dishonesty  it  stands  at  the  top  level  and  it  breaks  the  maxim  of 
quality that is “provide true information”. 
 
 
Fig.  1:  Levels  of  deceit  in  data  and  information  manipulation 
Source: Fisher and Downes 2008 
 
 
                                                      
1 It is the idea of  synecdoche described by Bevan and Hood: selected indicators are taking 
a part to stand for whole. But this assumption could lead HAs to focus on the chosen targets 
leaving uncontrolled the unobserved ones. 9 
 
How to detect and manage distortion phenomena. 
In 2007 the improvements recorded by HAs vary from  20% to  









































Fig. 2 Percentage of performance evaluation system indicators 
improved from 2006 to 2007.  
 
Are  all  these  improvements  genuine?  In  order  to  uncover 
whether  there  is  distortion  phenomena  due  to  misclassification  of 
data and information, the research team followed two steps: 
1.  Identification  of  the  pool  of  suspected 
cases; 
2.  Identification  of  the  real  improvements 
within the suspected cases 
 
The first step: Identification of the pool of suspected cases 
 
The  research  team  analyzed  the  trend  of  130  indicators  and 
selected  those  indicators  that  registered  notable  improvements
2 
across the years and the HAs.  
.  
                                                      
2 In the paper we use the term “improvement” both as the growth and the reduction of the 
indicators performance across the years. In fact, for instance, there could be suspected case 
of manipulation also when all HAs registered a negative trend while one HA has held steady.   10 
A  different  source  of  indicator  selection  came  from 
professionals who could notify anomalous changes: in the case of 
motivated warnings, indicators underwent further analysis.  
 
The second step: identification of real improvement 
Once the research team selected the suspected indicators, the 
second step was to report and discuss these improvements with top 
managers and professionals in order to detect the determinants of 
the results obtained. 
During  the  year  the  performance  indicators  were  monitored 
every  three  months  in  individual  meetings  between  the  Health 
Regional  Councilor  and  each  HA’s  CEO.  In  these  meetings,  the 
research  team  asked  for  explanations  for  those  areas  with  large 
improvements. 
In group meetings with other managers CEOs were called to 
provide evidence on how they reached these improvements.  
 
Control  mechanisms  and  other  contexts  influence  managers 
and  professionals  in  manipulating  data  and  information  (Fisher 
Downes 2008). For instance the use of a balanced approach could 
help  in  controlling  phenomena  of  deception  linked  to  reduced 
performance where targets do not apply. Other mechanisms such as 
the potential for high rewards, associated with a perception of a low 
probability of being caught, or few damaging consequences if caught, 
could act as triggers for deception.  
According to some authors (Hibbard et al 2003; Bevan 2006) 
the driver of performance change in the health care sector is the risk 
of reputation damage
3. If reputation drives changes in performance it 
could also drive to deception in order to avoid hassle and scrutiny 
mechanisms by professionals. 
                                                      
3  In  order  to  have  an  impact  on  health services  providers  ,  the  performance  evaluation 
system  should  satisfy  4  characteristics:  a  ranking  system,  published  and  widely 
disseminated, easily understood by the public; and followed up by future reports. 11 
 
Reputation  is  a  strong  driver,  above  all  in  the  context  of 
professional bureaucracies. It is considered a fundamental lever for 
successfully  introducing  multidimensional  performance  systems 
(Hibbard 2003). The hypothesis of the research team is exactly that 
of using reputation lever in order to tackle some problems linked to 
the gaming phenomena 
The research team assumed that the public investigation could 
discourage  data  manipulation:  the  request  for  evidence  to  explain 
large improvements in peer review meetings ease the accountability 
process and can be a deterrent for the future.  
 
Results 
For  the  first  time  in  2007  the  distortion  phenomenon  was 
detected and managed.  
The research team focused its attention on the ten indicators 
that show impressive improvements by one HA among the others. 
The  research  team  noticed  that  during  the  interviews  with  CEOs 
whose  HA  reported  notable  improvements,  when  CEOs  were  not 
only  able  to  describe  the  actions  put  in  place  to  increase  the 
performance  it  was  due  to  distortion  phenomena.  In  fact  in  some 
cases, after the inquiry, they admit that data has been manipulated. 
On  the  contrary  when  the  improvement  was  the  result  of  a  real 
organizational change, CEO was eager to demonstrate how his HA 
achieved it. 
 
Here it is reported one example of real improvements driven by 
organizational changes and one example of deceptive improvement.  
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of hip fractures operated timely 
(within 2 days from the admission): LHA 12 increases its result from 
9% in 2006 to 51% in 2007. This impressive improvement was due to 
the  hiring  of  a  new  professional  that  completely  reorganized  the   12 
clinical  pathway  in  the  orthopaedic  unit.  In  particular  he  has 




Figure  4  reports  an  example  of  data  manipulation.  The 
reduction  of  the  100.000  inhabitant  hospitalization  rate  for  heart 
failure in LHA 4 from 2.802 in 2006 to 1.362 in 2007 was due to the 






The 2008 partial results confirm which the real and deceptive 
improvements are. In fact, in the 2008 first six-month period LHA 12 
has  increased  even  more  the  percentage  of  timely  hip  fracture 
surgeries, to 60%. At the opposite, the hospitalization rate for heart 
failure in LHA 4 has come back to a value of 2.033, regressing to 
nearly the 2006 levels.    
These examples support the investigation results, and confirm 
the hypothesis that public explanation is a deterrent to considering 
the manipulation route. 
Gaming  has  been  found  more  in  indicators  concerning  small 
and  specific  areas,  such  as  the  rate  of  hospitalization  for  heart 
failure, while indicators that concern larger phenomena, such as the 
pre-surgical length of stay, were less involved. This effect could be 
linked to the difficulty for the HA to manipulate a large number of 
medical records spread out in several Departments, or, in a different 
view,  to  identify  if  there  are  recodifications  and  in  particular  to 
calculate the effect of recodifications on indicators that cover large 
phenomena. 
   
Conclusions 
Problems  linked  to  gaming  phenomena  are  widespread.  The 
experience reported in this paper shows that the path is at its early 
stages and necessary developments should be applied. In particular 
further  developments  are  planned  in  order  to  streamline  the 
identification  process  of  suspected  cases  and  to  better  analyze 
suspicious cases more in depth.  
 
In order to cope with the gaming phenomena Bevan and Hood 
suggested  two  types  of  remedies:  the  introduction  of  on-site 
inspections,  through  randomized  controls,  and  the  introduction  of 
uncertainty in to targets and rating systems. In this manner Bevan 
and  Hood  (2006)  introduce  into  the  regulation  an  high  degree  of 
unpredictability because it makes it difficult for managers to ascertain   14 
in advance how they will be assessed. Too much predictability in the 
name of transparency weakens controls by the gaming responses it 
invites. 
 
Following the first remedy, in 2008 the Health Regional Council, 
a  technical  consultant  commission  of  Tuscany  Region,  has  been 
asked for a check control. After preliminary selections made by the 
research team, the Health Regional Council should investigate on a 
sample  of  clinical  histories.  Moreover  it  should  identify,  ex-ante,  a 
pool  of  indicators  used  in  the  performance  evaluation  system  that 
could be more involved in the manipulation phenomena. . 
 
The contribution of this paper is linked to the role that the lever 
of  reputation  can  play  in  the  gaming  phenomena  through  peer 
reviews meetings and CEO public presentations as an accountability 
process. In fact publishing the performance results on one side and 
on the other, the agreement with the HAs CEOs to argue how the 
outlier  improvement  were  achieved  by  professionals,  worked  as 
deterrent to gaming behaviours. Moreover the habit of sharing the 
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